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Abstract 
 
In the ethnically fragmented countries, it is almost taken for granted that the EU 
has a positive impact on minority rights protection. Those states made important 
legislative changes improving the protection level granted to minorities, which 
without the EU’s conditionality would have been impossible. In response to the 
perspective of membership and the pressure accompanying it, they have adopted 
legislative changes in the course of the accession process. However, such 
domestic changes can be misleading in two aspects. Firstly, formal changes may 
not be followed by behavioral ones and usually a gap between legislative changes 
and their implementation can be observed. While for the former only rationally 
induced factors would be sufficient enough to instigate change, for the latter, a 
certain level of change in attitudes is also necessary. Secondly, the EU’s impact 
cannot be confined to the formal changes. It has an impact on the emergence of 
new attitudes, identities, and beliefs. These socialization-based changes might 
not be parallel with formal changes, which in time might lead to opposite 
behavioral shifts. 
The main argument of this paper is that Europeanization of minority rights in 
Turkey goes hand in hand with these two nexus. On the one hand, there is a top- 
to-bottom policy-Europeanization with respect to minority rights without parallel 
internalization at the governmental level. This means policy changes are not 
necessarily internalized in a way culminating in normative and behavioral shifts. 
There can be modest changes; however, the “core” of the minority protection 
system remains untouched at the institutional and legislative level. However, in 
general sense, the direction of domestic change is positive compared to the 
previous status quo. On the other hand, new patterns of recognition-exclusion 
nexus have emerged due to the EU’s involvement, underlying antagonism 
between majority-minority groups. Policy changes and their limited 
implementation have resulted in the recognition of the separate identities of the 
minorities, whose existence has long been questioned by the state. However, it 
has also underlined the “otherness” of those groups with regard to the public 
perception. While the EU’s involvement has made those minority groups more 
apparent, they became more exposed to discrimination and hostility. Therefore, 
Europeanization of policies does not lead automatically to Europeanization of 
national identities and beliefs on minorities, giving rise to harmonious 
coexistence. It rather becomes a pretext of sharpened nationalist discourse both 
in majority and minority groups in candidate countries. That is why policy and 
identity/belief Europeanization might go in opposite directions. 
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Europeanization of Minority Rights: Discourse, 
Practice, and Change in Turkey 
Zelal Kizilkan-Kisacik
1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the recent Eastern enlargement, the EU has set specific democratic 
conditions for the accession of the candidate countries and developed a new 
human rights policy, featured as an increased level of conditionality and 
fulfillment of certain requirements. It has used membership card as an 
incentive to implement human rights norms and principles in the countries 
striving to access the EU. All candidate countries have been engaged in a 
large-scale process of transformation approximating their standards to 
European practices. In this way, the EU has become an important external 
dynamic that changed domestic policies of the candidate countries. Promotion 
of minority and cultural rights has also appeared to be an important aspect of 
this enlargement discourse in this regard.  
Even though minority rights do not pertain to the traditional competence of 
the EU, the positive influence of the EU on the candidate countries has been 
strongly noticed. In the ethnically fragmented candidate countries, it is 
almost taken for granted that the EU has a positive impact on minority rights 
protection. Those states have made important legislative changes improving 
the protection level granted to minorities, which without the EU’s 
conditionality would not have been possible. In response to the perspective of 
membership and the pressure accompanying it, they have adopted legislative 
changes in the course of the accession process. Turkey is one of those 
candidate countries becoming the target of human and minority rights 
promotion policies of the EU. Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey has 
initiated several reforms on cultural and minority rights and hence recorded 
important progress. Although reforms are considered as not sufficient enough 
to meet the demanded standards, these amendments have opened the 
‘Pandora’s box’, resulting in a normative shift in public discourses.  
However, such domestic changes can be misleading. Firstly, formal changes 
may not be followed by behavioral ones. There is always a gap between 
legislative changes and their implementation. While only rationally induced 
factors would be sufficient enough for instigating change for the former, for 
the latter, a certain level of attitude change is necessary. Secondly, the EU’s 
impact cannot be confined to the formal changes. It has an impact on the 
emergence of new attitudes, identities, and beliefs. The change in identities 
 
 
1    I thank the referees for their constructive comments and Setenay Ozturk and Graciela Aguirre 
Holzmann for their linguistic improvements.  Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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and beliefs might not always be parallel with formal changes. It might lead to 
opposite behavioral tendencies.
2 Legislative changes can conceal deep-rooted 
political and social tendencies which become more visible in the course of the 
accession process.
3 
The main argument of this paper is that Europeanization of minority rights 
in Turkey goes hand in hand with these two nexus. On the one hand, there is a 
top-to-bottom policy-Europeanization with respect to minority rights without 
its parallel internalization. This means policy changes are not necessarily 
internalized in a way culminating in normative and behavioral shifts at the 
institutional, societal, and governmental level. The fundamental core of the 
protection system remains intact. On the other hand, new patterns of 
recognition-exclusion nexus have emerged due to the EU’s involvement, 
underlying antagonism between majority-minority groups. Policy changes and 
their limited implementation have resulted in the recognition of the separate 
identities of the minorities, whose existence has long been questioned by the 
state. However, it has also underlined the “otherness” of those groups with 
regard to the public perception. While the EU’s involvement has made those 
minority groups more apparent, they have also become more exposed to 
discrimination and hostility. Therefore, Europeanization of policies limited to 
formal changes does not lead automatically to Europeanization of national 
identities and beliefs on minorities, giving rise to harmonious coexistence. It 
rather becomes a pretext of sharpened nationalist discourse both in majority 
and minority groups in candidate countries. Hence, policy and identity/belief 
might go in opposite directions. 
This study employs Europeanization as an analytical framework since it 
considers change as a “two way process”.
4 The framework provides an 
opportunity for analyzing the impact of international changes on domestic 
level policies. Considering minority protection as a recently emerging area of 
influence, the framework provides the tools for understanding how the 
construction of the minority norms at the EU level has an impact on domestic 
change within the candidate countries. The framework also creates new 
means for analyzing how opportunities and constraints created by the 
accession process are instrumentally used or normatively internalized by 
different actors in domestic structure. On the whole, it gives the analytical 
tools to be used to understand the interaction of domestic and international 
factors at the same time. 
This paper consists of three parts. The first part analyzes Europeanization 
as a theoretical framework. Two forms of Europeanization are explored here. 
These are “policy-Europeanization” and “identity-Europeanization.” The 
second part traces how Europeanization of minority norms in Turkey takes 
place. The EU’s pressure on Turkey to adopt its current minority policies to 
 
 
2   Gwendolyn Sasse, "The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection during and 
Beyond EU Accession," 15(6) Journal of European Public Policy 2008, 842-860, 855. 
3   Ibid, 855.  
4    Tanja Börzel, "Pace Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence Sitting Member State Responses to 
Europeanization," 40(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 2002, 193-214, 193.  Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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the European ones constitutes basic concern of the discussion. The objective 
here is to outline the stance of the EU on Turkey’s current treatment of 
minorities. The last part analyzes the direct and indirect impact of the EU 
accession process on the policies and beliefs/identities concerning ethnic 
minorities. The aim is to find out policy and societal Europeanization of 
minority norms in Turkey. The essay concludes with a discussion of the 
general patterns of norm adoption with respect to the Kurdish minority. 
Methodologically, following the analyses of Europeanization as a theoretical 
framework, the Commission Reports since the Helsinki Decision in 1999 are 
analyzed in order to determine the pressure of the EU on minority rights in 
Turkey. Next, the constitutional amendments are explored to determine the 
degree of policy change. In order to find out the gap between policy changes 
due to the EU pressure and identity/belief change, the results of open ended 
interviews with representatives of civil society organizations in Turkey are 
presented. The focus of the paper is merely on Kurds as a minority group in 
Turkey, excluding the other non-Muslim minority groups from the discussion. 
That is why legislative changes and attitudes, which might have implications 
on the Kurdish groups, are only analyzed.  
 
2. Europeanization as Theoretical Framework 
Europeanization is a multi-dimensional and comprehensive concept. It is 
used to explain the different phenomena and processes of change like “the 
changes in external boundaries,” “developing institutions at the European 
level,” “central penetration of national systems of governance,” “exporting 
forms of political cooperation,” and “political unification project.”
5 It is also 
defined as a process of first construction, second diffusion, and third 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, ways of doing things, shared 
beliefs and norms at the EU level, and then their incorporation to the 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policy.
6 No 
consensus has yet been reached between scholars in terms of its definition 
and meaning. But in all definitions, Europeanization is described as “the 
transfer from “Europe” to other jurisdictions of policy, institutional 
arrangements, rules, beliefs, and norms”.
7 Consequently, the scope of 
Europeanization is not only limited to the adoption of legally binding 
legislations drawn at the EU level. It has implications for wider processes of 
change within the domestic structure.  
As no unanimous definition of Europeanization is available, clarifying the 
definition of the term is necessary in all scholarly debates using 
Europeanization as a theoretical framework. This study employs two different 
 
 
5   Johan Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization," 40(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 2002, 
921-952, 923-924.  
6   Claudio Radelli, "The Europeanization of Public Policy," in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radelli 
(ed.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003),30.  
7    Simon Bulmer, "Theorizing Europeanization," in Paolo Graziano and Vink Maarten (ed.) 
Europeanization: New Research Agendas, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 47. Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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forms of Europeanization. These are “policy-Europeanization” and “societal-
Europeanization.”
8 Both of them explain the domains in which the impact of 
European integration at the domestic level is felt. In policy-Europeanization, 
Europeanization is defined as the impact of “the development of the EU 
policies in particular, issue areas embodying new rules, norms, regulations, 
and procedures” on the domestic level policies.
9 As the EU level policy grows 
in its scope and depth, the numbers of issue areas, which are traditionally 
under the jurisdiction of national governments, are also included within the 
competence of the EU. More and more decisions are taken at the EU level. 
The EU gradually imposes strong pressure on member and candidate states to 
adapt their national policies to the European ones. By this way, European 
integration influences domestic policies.  
When addressing “policy Europeanization,” three mechanisms can be 
identified. These are positive, negative, and framing integration.
10 Positive 
integration envisages the concrete European institutional model to which 
member states adapt their domestic institutions.
11 In this mechanism, 
member states have limited discretion
12 and, consequently, the EU’s pressure 
is coercive. The level of “compatibility” or “goodness of fit” between the 
European and national level policies determines adaptation pressure of the 
EU.
13 Adaptation pressure increases when the misfit is high. In cases where 
there is a high compatibility between European requirements with the existing 
national arrangements, however, the pressure decreases.
14 Negative 
integration does not prescribe specific institutional arrangements, but it 
defines the rules of the game for different actors.
15 Framing integration only 
changes “domestic political climate by stimulating and strengthening the 
overall support for broader European reform objectives.”
16 For this reason, 
 
 
8   This categorization is quoted from: Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliber, "File: 
Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society," 10(1) South European Society & Politics 2005, 1-15. Diez 
also includes political Europeanization as another category. Political Europeanization explains the 
impact of the European integration on domestic structures and political process including national 
executives, administrative structures, and political parties. In this study this categorization is 
excluded, as it is not directly related with the issue.  
9   Thomas Risse and Maria Green Cowles, "Transforming Europe: Conclusion," in Maria Green Cowles, 
James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse (ed.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic 
Change (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 217-238, 218.  
10  Christoph Knill and Lehmkuhl Dirk, "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization," 
3(1)  European Integration Online Papers 1999, 2, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302746.  
11   Ibid.  
12    Featherstone, Kevin. "Introduction: In the Name o f  E u r o p e . "  I n  T h e  P o l i t i cs of Europeanization, 
edited by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radelli, 1-19. 14, ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)  
13   See the discussion concerning fit/misfit with the EU and national policies in: Thomas Risse, Maria 
Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction" in Maria 
Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse (ed.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 1-20, 6-7. Claudio Radelli, 
"Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change," 4(8) European Integration 
Online Papers 2000, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-008.pdf, Tanja Börzel and 
Thomas Risse, "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change," 4(15) European 
Integration Online Papers 2000, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf. 
14  Börzel and Risse, "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change…", 2.  
15   Knill and Dirk, "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization…", 2.  
16   Ibid. Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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the influence of framing integration on domestic arrangements is weak 
compared to positive integration.  
Since there is no institutional template for minority rights which candidate 
and member states can adopt, positive integration cannot be considered in 
analyzing minority rights. Minority norm adoption can be related to the 
patterns of negative and framing integration of the policies. On the one hand, 
the accession process sets “respect for and protection of minorities” as a 
condition for European integration and hence compels the governments to 
take necessary measures without specifying particular institutional templates. 
Such pressure challenges the existing power equilibrium between majority and 
minority groups and provides new opportunity structure for them. On the 
other hand, European beliefs and ideas trigger the mobilization of domestic 
actors that prompts for European democratic and human rights reforms. Even 
though actual impact of such mobilization depends on their power to reflect 
their preferences on national reforms in the concerned institutional 
opportunities and constraints, they provide domestic European support for the 
Europeanization of minority norms. 
In ‘societal Europeanization’ or ‘Europeanization of identities’, European 
integration influences “the construction of the systems of meanings and 
collective understandings, including social identities.”
17 Europeanization of 
policy areas has an important impact on the perception, beliefs, values, and 
collective understanding of individuals and social groups. In this kind of 
Europeanization, the EU norms not only regulate behavior, but also have an 
impact on “the way actors see themselves” and, therefore, impact their 
preferences.
18 With regard to collective identities and beliefs, the term 
“adaptation pressure” is not strongly relevant.
19 This policy neither prescribes 
concrete institutional requirements nor changes the institutional context for 
strategic interaction. However, it affects domestic beliefs and the cognitive 
structure and thereby influences preferences and strategies of the domestic 
actors indirectly. It is different from and comprehensive than framing 
integration, as it encompasses not only changes in “policy beliefs” but also 
“societal self definitions” evolving in the course of European integration.
20  
In “societal Europeanization,” domestic change is generally considered a 
process of international socialization which results in “states internalization 
of constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in international 
environment.”
21 Internalization is the adoption of social beliefs and practices 
in a way that the actors consider them as their own and follow them 
 
 
17   Risse and Cowles, "Transforming Europe: Conclusion…, 219 " See also this discussion in Risse, 
Thomas."A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation State Identities," in Maria 
Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse (ed.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 198-217.  
18   Diez, Agnantopoulos, and Kaliber, "File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society...", 6. 
19   Risse, "A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation State Identities…", 198.  
20   Diez, Agnantopoulos, and Kaliber, "File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society…", 6.  
21   Schimmelfennig, Frank. "International Sozialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in 
Institutional Environment." 6(1) European Journal of International Relations 2000, 109-39, 111.  Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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autonomously. 
22 The most important question here is what the constitutive 
values and beliefs institutionalized at the EU level are. This is a 
comprehensive discussion which transcends the scope of this paper.
23 It 
should be sufficient to say here that European integration is elite driven and 
based on a treaty process. Thereby, the constitutional values form significant 
constitutive aspects of the EU’s identity.
24 According to the recently adopted 
Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, the values of the EU is to exercise “respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” 
Socialization in this respect is the process of internalization of these norms to 
the extent that they become an integral part of the national identities. In 
minority rights case, it is the re-construction of consensual national identity 
on the basis of the principle of real equality, guaranteed within the 
institutional and constitutional structure and internalized at the elite and 
society level. 
However, socialization does not always have to be successful.
25 Legislative 
changes do not automatically initiate belief and identity changes. Formal 
rules can be changed due to the EU pressure. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily warrant their parallel internalization. Hence, legislative changes 
in the field of minority rights may not result in the emergence of the 
construction of consensual identities. The adopted norms are not to be 
internalized to the level that they turn out to be an integral part of the 
national identities. On the contrary, they can go in opposite directions. While 
the legislations become more liberal and European in consequence of the EU 
pressure, national identities develop into nationalist and less European ones. 
The involvement of the EU does not instigate the construction of new 
identities on the basis of the constitute values and beliefs institutionalized at 
the EU level.  
Both at the policy and identity/belief level, the patterns of 
Europeanization drawn by the theoretical framework can be employed to the 
changes in the minority regime of Turkey. In the case of Turkey, these 
different forms of Europeanization follow opposite directions. On the one 
hand, the adaptation pressure to meet the Copenhagen political criteria 
makes policy changes necessary, forcing the governments in power to amend 
pre-existing minority legislations. On the other hand, such policy changes do 
not generate the internalization of emerging beliefs, values, and identities 
attached to those policies. This takes place not only at the elite level but also 
the society level. Policy changes, as a result of the European integration 
process, do not result in the construction of new consensual identities or 
 
 
22    See Jeffrey Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 43(1) 
International Studies Quarterly 1999, 84-114; Jeffrey Checkel, "Social Construction and 
Integration," 6(4) Journal of European Public Policy 1999, 545-560.  
23    See a good overview of European values in: Gabriel von Toggenburg, "The Debate on European 
Values and the Case of Cultural Diversity," 1 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (2004). 
24   Ibid.  
25   Schimmelfennig,  "International  Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in Institutional 
Environment…", 112.  Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
 
approaches which re-establishes new minority-majority relations on the basis 
of equality. On the contrary, Europeanization of minority policies in Turkey 
induces “retrenchment.” National identities and values become less European 
than they used to be. Recognition of cultural rights of ethnic minorities 
empowers domestic opposition, opposing reforms. This process also sets the 
intensification of anti-minority sentiments in motion, both in public discourses 
and in extreme cases, through manifestation of physical attacks and mobs 
against minorities. 
 
3. Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
In order to place the specific case of Turkey to the Europeanization 
theoretical framework, four questions should be answered. These are:  
•  What are the pre-existing domestic policies, cognitions, and 
beliefs concerning minority protection?”  
•  What kind of policies, rules, and beliefs regarding minorities are 
established at the EU level and how is it different from the national 
ones? 
•  What is the level of domestic change as a result of the EU’s 
pressure?  
In answering these questions for Turkey’s case, the pre-existing minority 
regime of Turkey, the exposition of this regime to the pressure of the EU 
during the accession process, and the degree of domestic change resulting 
from this pressure should be analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Domestic Impact of European Integration on Minority Protection 
 
Analyzing the Europeanization of the protection of minority rights in 
Turkey- which is defined as a domestic change arising from the EU’s pressure- 
is the main issue area of this article. For this reason, the independent variable 
www.eurac.edu/edap 11  edap@eurac.edu Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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of this research is the EU’s adaption pressure on the protection of minority 
rights in Turkey (see figure 1 for variables). The dependent variable is 
domestic change. Domestic change is operationalized in terms of policy and 
belief/identity change (see Figure 1). Policy changes are measured by 
legislative changes. This is the direct and intended impact of the EU. Identity 
changes are measured by the discourses of political leaders and interviews, 
forming indirect and unintended consequences of the pressure of the EU.  
3.1 Minority Protection Regime of Turkey  
In order to understand the influence of the European integration on the level 
of protection granted to minorities, it is necessary to analyze the pre-existing 
protection system of minority rights of Turkey preceding the start of the 
Europeanization process and then how such a system has changed due to the 
pressure of the EU. Turkey’s pre-existing official minority policy was based on 
the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, which was concluded between Turkey and the 
Allied Powers on 24 July 1923. Following the Turkish national movement, this 
treaty replaced the Treaty of Sèvres, signed with the Allies on 10 August 1920, 
partitioning the Ottoman Empire. The treaty outlines the legal framework 
concerning the protection system of minority rights in Turkey. Additionally, it 
sets out general provisions for all Turkish citizens regardless of birth, 
nationality, language, race, or religion, it confers implicit rights to all 
minorities, and the Treaty also gives explicit rights to non-Muslim minorities. 
These rights cover the right to use minority languages in schools and in the 
press, and the right to exercise religious faith (See Table 1). These are 
individual rather than collective minority rights, granted to “Turkish citizens 
belonging to” national minorities but not to minority communities. Contrary 
to the agreements concerning the protection of minority rights signed after 
the First World War that recognize race, language, and religion as criteria for 
identifying minorities, Turkey embraces a very narrow definition of the term 
minority.
26 It only employs religion as a sole criterion for defining 
minorities.
27 This situation gives rise to the emergence of two different groups 
of minorities in Turkey: Firstly, the officially recognized non-Muslim 
minorities, like Greeks, Jews, and Armenians and secondly, the ones holding 
the basic characteristics of being a minority but lying outside the treaty’s 
official scope, like the Kurds, Alevis, Assyrians, Laz, and so on. The 
 
 
26   Baskin Oran, "The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and Current 
Issues," in Zehra Kabasakal Arat (ed.),  Human Rights in Turkey, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 35-56, 37.  
27   “Religion” is used as sole criteria of defining minorities. However, it is not employed by Turkey as 
all-encompassing criteria. Religion denotes non-Muslim groups but not all religiously different 
groups. That is why the Alevis whose religious beliefs, rituals, and interpretation of Islam are 
different from dominant Islamic-Sunni identity are not considered as “minority” in Turkey.  Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
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implementation of the rights enshrined in the Lausanne Treaty is restricted to 
only the former but not to the latter group.
28 
There are several historical, political, and cognitive reasons underlying the 
existence of such a narrow definition of minorities in Turkey. Historically, the 
categorization is in line with the millet (nationality) system of the Ottoman 
Empire taken over by the new Turkish Republic. The Millet (nation) system 
shaped the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire which ruled the 
communities on the basis of religious and sect lines. Non-Muslim minorities 
could organize as “communities possessing certain delegated powers under 
their own ecclesiastical heads.”
29 Such a system gave the minorities an 
important level of freedom vis-á-vis  state. Their internal affairs were 
administrated by the members of the communities in question according to 
their own customs, traditions, and laws. But at the same time, it also created 
a hierarchy of different communities in line with their religious affiliation. 
The people of Muslim origins, regardless of their ethnicity and sect, formed 
the “core” and were considered as a “constituting element,” whereas non- 
Muslims were the “periphery” of the empire, forming, namely “second class 
citizens.” Considering that all Muslims belonged to the same “first class” 
community or nationality, ethnic differences were not used as tools for the 
exclusion of people to the status of minorities.
30  
 
Table 1: The Rights granted by the Lausanne Treaty to all Turkish Citizens 
and Non-Muslim Minorities 
General Rights for all Turkish 
citizens 
Particular Rights for Non-Muslim 
Minorities 
The Right to Life and Liberty 
(Art:38) 
Freedom of Movement and of 
Emigration (Art:38) 
The Right to Manifest Religion 
(Art:38) 
Equal Civil and Political Rights 
(Art:38) 
The Right to Use any Language in 
Private, Commerce, Religion, Press, 
Public Meetings (Art: 39) 
Equal Treatment and Security 
before Law (Art:39 and Art:40)  
For Turkish citizens with another  The  Right  to  Access  Public 
 
 
28   Granting minority rights to non- Muslim minorities does not mean their full implementation. Turkey 
has failed to implement the provisions of the treaty fully in two respects. On the one hand, not all 
of the non-Muslims are given permission to enjoy the rights granted by the Treaty. Turkey only 
implemented the provisions of the Treaty to Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, excluding other non- 
Muslim minorities like Syriacs, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Nestorians from protection system. There 
is no provision in the Treaty that the rights granted in the Treaty are particularly granted only to 
these groups. On the other hand, some of the provisions of the Treaty were denied even for three 
major non-Muslim minority groups, like granting financial assistance (Article 41/2), establishing 
special commission (Article 42/3), and the right to foundation (Article 43/3). See this discussion in 
Oran, "The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and Current Issues…"  
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native tongue than Turkish; the right 
to use their native language orally 
before the Court (Art: 39) 
Employment ( Article 39) 
  The Right to Establish, Manage, 
Control Charitable, Religious, and 
Social Institutions (Art:40)  
  The Right to Set up Schools and 
Institutions of Instruction (Art:40) 
  The Right to Education in Minority 
Language (Art: 40, Art:41) 
 
Politically, the ruling and/or the military elites of the Turkish Republic 
wanted to establish an ethnically homogenous nation-state and such a state 
anticipated the construction of a homogenous Turkish national identity.
31 
Accordingly, rather than granting positive rights to miscellaneous amounts of 
groups and promoting their culture and identity, the Kemalist establishment 
wanted to subordinate different ethnic and religious identities. Such “an 
exclusive Turkish ethnocentricity,” which sowed the roots of the Kurdish 
problem as well, prevented the emergence of “hyphenated citizenship” for 
people claiming to have more than one nationality, like the Turkish Kurds or 
Turkish Bosnians.
32  
Cognitively, Turkish elites considered minority groups and their external 
supporters as “scapegoats” in that they have allegedly caused the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. In the 19
th century, the Western powers 
increased their concerns on the non-Muslim minorities and used them as a 
pretext for interfering with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Even 
today, the contemporary Turkish Kemalist establishment embodies the same 
fear of disintegration and mistrust in its sub-consciousness not only for the 
non-Muslim groups but also for the Muslim groups other than the dominant 
Sunni groups of Turkish origin. Located in the “center” of the Turkish system 
with its institutions and values, the Kemalist elite have always regarded the 
ethnic and linguistic minorities situated at the “periphery” with suspicion, 
assuming that further liberalization of their rights would lead to political 
instability; consequently, they adopted the Ottoman vision of establishing a 
nation that would be based on a homogenous community of Sunni Muslims.  
Indeed, starting from the early years of the Republic, Turkey regards every 
kind of discrepancy from the standard Turkish-Sunni identity as a threat to its 
political stability. It constantly tries to eliminate the manifestation of ethnic-
linguistic-religious differences in the realm of public and political life. Legally 
speaking, the word “minority” or “the situation of any other ethnic groups” is 
not mentioned in the Turkish constitution. Accordingly, the expression of the 
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existence of minorities on account of the differences of creed, race, and 
language are prohibited. Political activities that incorporated the objective of 
constructing minorities were banned. No ethnic languages have since been 
permitted in public areas, in party programs, regulations, and so on. All of the 
acts mentioned above are considered as acts “disrupting the national integrity 
by means of creating minorities” according to Article 81 of the Turkish 
constitution enumerated in the provisions on the Law of political parties.  
The way Turkey views minorities is directly linked to the contemporary 
discussions on the minority aspect of the Kurdish problem, leaving the Kurdish 
people, with a population of approximately 12.000.000-15.000.000 and who 
simply constitute the largest ethnic community in Turkey, without any 
minority protection system.
33 The official ideology of Turkey towards the 
Kurdish issue has so far consisted of denying the existence of a Kurdish 
minority, accompanied by the brutal repression of those who speak about a 
Kurdish cause. As Bruinessen (1992, p. 242) states, since 1925 there has been 
a systemic policy aiming at the detribalization and the assimilation of the 
Kurds in Turkey.
34 Through this process, everything that is related to a 
separate Kurdish identity was to be abolished, including language, 
(traditional) clothing, and Kurdish names.
35 There has been a constant policy 
of repression applied in Turkey, including the ban on Kurdish language, 
literature, publication, school, and deportation of thousands of towns and 
villages.  
3.2 The EU’s Approach to the Minority Policies of Turkey 
The above-mentioned minority policies of Turkey became the target of the 
criticism of the EU since early 1990s. Under the framework of minority 
protection, the EU has addressed not only the situation of officially 
recognized minorities, but also ethnic, religion, and linguistic groups falling 
outside of the scope of the Lausanne Treaty. Hence, it has exerted pressure 
on Turkey to enlarge identity and cultural rights accorded to both of these 
groups.  
Internally, the EU does not have clear standards and strategies of minority 
protection.
36 There are certain legislations that might provide protection to 
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minorities, but the protection of minorities is not their initial concern. Even 
the word “minority” was incorporated to the primary legislation of the EU 
with the recently concluded Lisbon Treaty. Externally, minority protection is 
one of the most prominent topics in the accession process. Having 
incorporated respect for and the protection of minorities as a condition for 
membership in the Copenhagen criteria, the EU has monitored the degree to 
which candidates complied with this condition and has thereby positively 
influenced the situation of the minorities. Compared with other international 
organizations, like the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the EU’s impact on 
transforming its candidate countries is stronger. It has used its political 
capacity, normative and economic attractiveness, and financial resources at 
its disposal to transform the countries seeking membership. 
In the absence of any consolidated standards on the rights granted to 
minorities at the supranational level, the “goodness of fit” between the EU 
and the Turkish minority policies does not determine the degree of adaptation 
pressure. The EU exerts pressure on Turkey without having standard 
protection levels applied to all member states. Hence, analyzing the reports 
of the Commission provides important evidence about how the EU evaluates 
the situation of minorities and which minorities are de facto recognized by 
the EU. Thus, the reports of the Commission would provide insights about the 
concrete demands of the EU and the degree of adaptation pressure to change 
the situation of ethnic minorities, like the Kurds.  
With the Commission’s regular annual reports since 1998, as the key 
instruments of the EU to evaluate the progress of candidate states, the EU has 
monitored developments concerning the Kurdish minority. These reports 
provide important clues with respect to not only the level of normative 
fulfillment of the EU’s standards, but also the EU’s political and legal position 
vis-á- vis the Kurdish issue. The Commission deals with the Kurdish issue on 
the basis of three frameworks. These frameworks are all related to, first, the 
protection of minorities without making any explicit reference to group rights, 
second, the improvement of individual fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
third, democratization. 
In terms of the framework concerning minority protection, the Commission 
announces in its first progress report on Turkey in 1998 that “there is a de 
jure and de facto difference in the treatment accorded to minorities officially 
recognized under the Lausanne Treaty and those outside its scope.”
37 It points 
out that the entitlement of a minority status is limited to merely the 
Armenians, Jews, and Greeks and hence that the Kurds are excluded from the 
status of being a minority. Focusing on the social and economic features of 
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the Kurds, the Commission expresses the presence of restrictions on the civil 
and political rights of the Kurdish minority due to the armed conflict in the 
south east region of Turkey.
38 Rather than proposing positive measures that 
should be taken in this regard, the EU makes references to the instruments of 
the Council of Europe, such as the Framework Convention on the Protection of 
National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
L a n g u a g e s .  I t  q u o t e s  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  the report of the Council of Europe, 
claiming that Turkish citizens with Kurdish origins should have the material 
opportunity and material resources to use and sustain their native languages 
and cultural traditions as defined by the conditions pronounced by the above 
mentioned covenants.
39 What the EU understands from minority rights is the 
right to broadcast, the right to learn, and the right to receive instruction in 
the mother tongue as well as the right to use local names.  
With regard to the anti-discrimination aspect of the protection of 
minorities, the focus is placed initially on Turkey’s declining to sign the 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and to transpose the EC Directive based on Article 13 of the EU 
Treaty. The EU, as well as the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM), generally emphasizes the shortcomings in terms of 
comprehensive civil or administrative law provisions against discrimination 
and measures aligning with Article 13 and its secondary legislation, both of 
which entail a combat against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation. The EU’s 
stress on non discrimination is stronger in social and employment policy. It 
does not directly allude to the kind of discrimination that the members of a 
minority group in general and the Kurds, in particular, might face on the 
grounds of language and religion. Though limited, the Commission Report in 
2005 indicates for the first time that minorities in Turkey face “de facto 
discrimination and encounter difficulties in acceding to administrative and 
military positions.” Moreover, in the Accession Partnership document in 2008, 
it is stated that the efforts to change curricula and textbooks should be 
intensive in order to eliminate discriminatory language.
40 These statements 
are important priorities for combating discrimination.  
The EU also addresses the Kurdish issue on the basis of general individual 
human rights framework, which has implicit or explicit implications for the 
situation of the Kurdish people in Turkey. In the first regular report, the 
Commission states that the violation of human rights is correlated with the 
reaction of the government and army to the Kurdish conflict.
41 In the part 
dealing with the situation of human rights in Turkey, the Commission 
expresses certain human rights violations with respect to the freedom of 
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expression, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of press. These 
are classical human rights which are bestowed on all people regardless of 
ethnic origin or minorities. But when the EU reviews these issues, it makes 
references to the situation of the Kurds whose rights are very often violated. 
The Commission, without directly using the words “Kurdish citizens”, also 
expresses issues like torture, disappearances, and extra judicial executions, 
which are highly widespread in the Kurdish regions.
42 In terms of the freedom 
of expression, the Commission states that the “expression of pro-Kurdish 
views is fought by the Turkish state.”
43 Moreover, it points out that Turkish 
courts restrict “the expression of views with which the State disagrees, 
notably when it concerns the situation of the population of Kurdish origin.”
44 
In terms of the freedom of press, the Commission purports that “objective 
and independent reporting by Turkish media of the Kurdish issue is not 
possible.”
45  
The Commission recommends “the recognition of certain forms of cultural 
identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, 
provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism,”
46 as a civil and non 
military solution for the Kurdish issue. It advocates socio-economic 
development strategies, the establishment of conditions for the full 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms by the Kurds, the return of displaced 
persons to their villages, the abolishment of the village guard system,
47 and 
the development of a comprehensive approach to reduce regional 
disparities.
48 The Commission also focuses on the conflict resolving aspect of 
the problem by emphasizing the importance of creating a dialogue with the 
local counterparts.
49 These solution options are evidently important steps that 
need to be taken for finding a solution for the Kurdish issue. However, they 
are neither comprehensive nor precise, and they ignore the inter-dependent 
and multi-dimensional aspect of the problem. 
Overall, the Commission adopts a very careful approach to the Kurdish 
issue. It abstains from creating any strong negative reaction while dealing 
with sensitive issues of Turkey. This attitude of the Commission is in line with 
the general enlargement policy of the European Union. The EU’s primary aim 
is to sustain progress by means of offering accession as rendered in the “road 
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map,” which avoids any adverse criticism of the candidate countries.
50 For 
this reason, the Commission pays supreme attention to use the right wording 
when making any references to the situation of the Kurds. It uses expressions 
such as “Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin,” “Kurdish citizen,” “Kurdish 
population,” or “cultural rights for all Turks, irrespective of their ethnic 
origin.” Even though it deals generally with the Kurdish problem under the 
part of minority protection, it restrains from using the notion of “minority” or 
“Kurds” apart from the Commission Report of 1998.
51 Instead, it prefers the 
expression of “the situation in southeast.” It also never uses the notion of 
“Kurdish people,” which in turn could imply that Kurds be given the right of 
self-determination. In addition, the Commission does not possess any specific 
template or framed model on how and what kinds of measures should be 
adopted and implemented for the Kurdish minority. They generally monitor 
the evolution of the minority policy in Turkey and propose further measures 
when it is required. Moreover, when the EU depicts minority rights, it 
emphasizes individual rather than collective rights. It does not make any 
implications, such as Kurds being an ethnic group, who should be granted 
certain rights specific to them as well as substantive/positive elements of the 
minority rights or provisions.
52 For this reason, in the regular reports, the 
Commission attempts to refer to Kurdish people, for instance, as “members of 
a group,” who should be given certain individual rights rather than be given 
rights as a group. This attitude complies with the general liberal 
individualistic approach of the EU, upholding the individual rather than the 
group itself to which the individuals may belong. 
3.3 The Impact of the EU on Domestic Change in Turkey  
Since the Helsinki Council Decision in 1999, the EU has generated important 
political and legislative reforms with respect to the protection of human and 
minority rights in Turkey. Particularly, with the coming of the AKP 
government in power-in the course of 2002-2005 Turkey has undergone an 
unprecedented transformation in terms of its minority policies. It is well 
documented and evidently stated in many studies that reforms regarding 
minority rights took place in this period as a direct outcome of the EU’s 
adaptation pressure which is based on the explicitly declared conditions and 
rewards for Turkey.
53 On the other hand, the reforms of the EU led to an 
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important level of democratization and provided the ground for discussing 
many fault lines of Turkey; they also have promoted nationalist reactions from 
the right wing groups. Turkish politics have appeared to be polarized in 
between not only the Kemalist-secular and the Islamic-conservative front but 
between the Turkish and the Kurdish society as well. Despite their 
shortcomings in terms of meeting international standards, those reforms have 
challenged the institutional-ideological structure of the Kemalist 
establishment and this has resulted in the reconsideration of what majority-
minority relationship should be and in turn reconsideration of the nation-state 
identity. 
3.3.1. Europeanization of Minority Policies and Legislations  
The EU has exerted strong pressure to promote respect for and protection of 
minorities in accordance to European standards, including the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. As a response to the EU’s demands 
concerning fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey adopted the 
National Program in 2001. However, the program did not address the question 
of minorities explicitly. It only stated that the free usage of different 
languages and dialects of Turkish citizens can be guaranteed.
54 Despite 
limited focus of the National Program, seven harmonization reform packages 
were adopted in the period of 1999-2005 in Turkey. These reforms were a 
direct answer from Turkey to the EU`s incentive of membership presented by 
the Helsinki Council Decision.  
In the first harmonization package adopted by the tripartite coalition 
government of Democratic Social Party (DSP), Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP), and Mather Land Party (ANAP) in 2001, some improvements were made 
concerning the freedom of expression and press. The Law Amending Several 
Articles of the Constitution No: 4709 on 3 October 2001 changed 35 articles of 
the Turkish Constitution. Article 26
55 and Article 28
56 of these amendments 
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loosened the restrictions on the use of minority languages. The phrase 
“languages prohibited by law shall not be used in the expression and 
dissemination of thought” is deleted from Article 26. Similarly, “publications 
shall not be made in any language prohibited by law” was removed from 
Article 28 of the Constitution. Those articles generally regulated the rights 
concerning the freedom of expression and broadcasting. This expression was 
used to ban the use of “Kurdish” without particularly mentioning the term 
“Kurdish.”
57 Despite its symbolic importance, these legislative changes did 
not make a real improvement in terms of using minority languages, since the 
use of minority languages could still be limited by the laws made for securing 
the “indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation.” Broad 
interpretation of these restriction grounds can still be used against the 
persons and groups that hold different opinions from state authorities on the 
basis of political considerations.
58  
Moreover, the Law Amending Several Laws, No: 4771 on 3 August 2002 
enabled broadcasting and the opening of private courses with the purpose of 
teaching “the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish 
citizens in their daily lives.” Article 8 of the law makes broadcasting in 
minority languages possible by inserting a provision to Article 4 (1) of the Law 
on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio Station and Television 
Channels No: 3984, adopted in 1984. According to the provision, broadcasting 
in the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in 
their daily lives can be possible, as long as such broadcasts do not contradict 
the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic as enshrined in the 
Constitution or with the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and 
nation. 
By this change, the broadcasting of programs in the languages traditionally 
used in everyday life by Turkish nationals was allowed.
59 After ensuring the 
legal basis enabling broadcasting in different languages, the implementing 
regulation called the Regulation Concerning the Language of Radio and 
Broadcasts on 18 December 2002 was accepted. This regulation authorized 
only the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) to broadcast in non 
official languages, excluding private enterprises from the right to broadcast.
60 
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It designated the duration and content of the broadcasts. Broadcasts were to 
be made in these languages and dialects through a protocol concluded 
between the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) and the TRT. 
Furthermore, surveys would be undertaken to establish the listener-viewer 
profile of these broadcasts by TRT. Even though the TRT is a state owned 
broadcasting enterprise, the regulation imposed several restrictions on the 
TRT as well. For instance, the TRT was not allowed to broadcast children 
programs or any themes apart from news, music, and culture.
 61 The duration 
of the broadcasting could not exceed 45 minutes per day and a total of 4 
hours per week for the radio and 30 minutes per day and a total of 2 hours per 
week for TV broadcasts. In addition, it was required that Turkish subtitles be 
used which would fully correspond to the broadcast in terms of timing and the 
content.
62 Such broadcasts should not contradict the fundamental principles 
of the Turkish Republic, nor undermine the indivisible integrity of the state 
with its territory and nation.
63  
Despite the fact that the legislation paved the way for lifting the ban on 
programs for minorities, the time that elapsed between passing the legislation 
and implementing it delayed the realization of the broadcasts in minority 
languages. For instance, the TRT appealed to the Council of State to suspend 
the implementation of the regulation. The TRT claimed that the regulation by 
which the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) compelled the TRT 
to broadcast in different languages and dialects spoken by Turkish citizens, 
contradicted its autonomous structure and the Law on the Establishment of 
Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts. The Council of State 
decided on 03 July 2003, that it was only possible to induce the TRT to 
broadcast in local languages by amending the regulation of the TRT. This 
decision delayed the implementation of the regulation.  
This issue was addressed within the framework of the 6
th Harmonization 
law. Given the reactions of the TRT, “the Law Amending Several Laws, No: 
4928” on 15 July 2003, Article 4 of The Law on the Establishment and 
Broadcasts of Radio Station and Television Channels regulating broadcasting in 
local languages was changed. The procedures and principles concerning the 
above-mentioned law were implemented through the second implementing 
regulation (enacted on 5 January 2004) on the Broadcast in Languages and 
 
 
languages and dialects. Within the framework of the financial contributions of the Radio and 
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Dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens. Subsequent to the enactment 
of the second regulation, the right to broadcast in local dialects and languages 
was also given to private national radio and television companies provided 
that the approval of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) was 
gained.
64  
As a result of these legislative changes, the TRT started to broadcast in 
different minority languages, including Kurdish, Arabic, Bosnian, Zaza,  and 
Circassian on 7 June 2004. Thereafter, 11 regional radios and TV enterprises 
applied to RTUK with the request to broadcast in different languages. 
Following the evaluation of these applications by the RTUK, 3 local and 
regional radios and TV channels were given permission to broadcast in 
Kirmanci and Zaza dialects on 7 March 2006. Moreover, the decision of RTUK 
on 30 May 2006 reduced the limitation on the duration of broadcasting and 
brought some flexibility in terms of timing. As it was stated in the previous 
regulation, broadcasting in minority languages was subject to important 
restrictions for private establishments as well, including the limitations on the 
prohibition of broadcasting children programs, the teaching of local 
languages, and the requirement of the authorization of the RTUK for any kind 
of broadcasting and so on.  
Certain improvements were also made in terms of the teaching of minority 
languages. The Law on the Education and Teaching of Foreign Languages was 
changed on 9 August 2002, allowing the “learning of different languages and 
dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily life”.
65 As it is 
stated above, the law on private educational institutions allows Greeks, 
Armenians, and Jews to open minority schools. All other Muslim minorities 
have been deprived of these rights. By this amendment, private courses can 
be set up for teaching local languages. These courses were to be regulated 
under the Law on Private Education Institution.
66 As it is for most of the 
provisions of the Turkish legal system, the employment of such rights should 
not contradict the “indivisible integrity of state and nation.” 
Moreover, this law was further amended on 30 July 2003. The expression 
“any language other than Turkish cannot be taught as mother language” in 
Turkish education and training institution was added, restricting the teaching 
of local languages to only private language courses.
67 The learning and 
teaching of other languages traditionally used by Turkish nations in their 
everyday lives can be carried out in private courses only. There can be no 
education violating fundamental principles of the indivisible integrity of the 
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State with it territory and nation. The establishment and supervision of such 
courses are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. The foreign 
languages to be taught and learnt in Turkey are determined by the Council of 
Ministers.  
Despite the importance of these amendments, there are important 
problems in terms of their implementation. With regards to the “curriculum, 
appointment of teachers, the criteria of enrollment, including age 
restriction,”
68 there are still important restrictions. According to Article 10, 
the curriculum of the courses must be approved by the Ministry of Education. 
It must have a specified name, level, and duration. Moreover, only Turkish 
citizens with at least a primary education can attend the courses. People 
under the age of 18 years are not given permission to attend the courses. 
People following these courses should obey the dress code of the Ministry of 
Education and so on.  
These initiatives have been considered by Kurdish elites to be insufficient 
in providing a resolution to the language problem of the Kurds.
69 Due to the 
institutional and legal restrictions, it seems unlikely that this problem will be 
solved in the near future. Firstly, law makers formulated the provisions as 
“language and dialects traditionally spoken by Turkish nationals.” They do not 
address the owners of such rights as “minorities” or they avoid mentioning the 
name of their native languages. This wording is in line with the traditional-
historical minority policy of Turkey, which does not accept the existence of 
minorities apart from those recognized by the Lausanne Treaty. Moreover, 
according to Kurban, this wording degrades “the symbolic value of minority 
languages by conceptualizing them as traditional languages rather than 
instruments of communication that minorities cherish, cultivate, and 
enjoy.”
70 Secondly, the collective understanding attributed to the language 
policies of Turkey remains unchanged. There is no amendment on Article 42 of 
the Constitution which gives Turkish the mother tongue status. Moreover, 
Article 3 of the Turkish constitution expresses the language of state as Turkish 
rather than the official language of state.
71 Without amendment of such 
rights, it would not be possible to induce the teaching of minority languages 
as mother tongue in public institutions. This is one of the most important 
demands of the Kurds. However, it does not seem to be possible in the near 
future fulfillment of such demands. Article 3 of the Turkish Constitution is an 
irrevocable provision and Turkey makes important reservations to the 
provisions and protocols of international instruments which contradict Article 
42 and the Treaty of Lausanne. 
72 
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Apart from these developments, in 2009, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan 
declared that his government initiated a process of “democratic opening” that 
would improve the rights of the minorities, especially those of the Kurdish 
ethnic group. Though the full content of the initiative was not stated very 
clearly, yet the basic objective of the initiative was primarily to build 
confidence between the state and Kurdish citizens through granting broader 
cultural and political rights to the Kurds in Turkey and secondly, to persuade 
the PKK members to lay down arms and to end their insurgency. This 
‘package’ of democratic amendments was submitted for discussion at the 
Parliament on 10 November 2009. Despite the fact that the government 
declared its commitment several times to proceed with the package, it has 
lagged behind in terms of its implementation. However, important legal 
arrangements were made within the framework of the government’s 
democratic initiative since 2009.  
Firstly, on January 2009, the state owned broadcasting enterprise (the TRT) 
commenced broadcasting 24 hours in Kurdish by means of the newly 
established TRT 6. However, this has promoted negative reactions both from 
the opposition parties and the Kurds due to the lack of a sound lawful base for 
the broadcast.
73 As internal and external pressure surmounted in this 
direction, a new regulation drafted by Turkey’s Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTÜK) was brought into force on 13 November 2009. Actually, this 
was not a new regulation. It only revised the previous regulation enacted on 
25 January 2004 by removing the restriction on the duration of broadcasts in 
Kurdish by private television stations.
74 The only particular requirement 
included in the regulation was the use of Turkish subtitles only during the 
news bulletins, contrary to the previous one that demanded Turkish subtitles 
be used in the course of all programs and which was yet but an additional 
burden on the private broadcasting stations.  
Secondly, Turkey has begun restoring the names of Kurdish villages as part 
of the democratic opening process. The renaming of Kurdish villages is subject 
to the will of the residents of those places. If the inhabitants of any village or 
town demand to use a Kurdish name for their town, they are supposed to 
apply to the district governor. Following this, a referendum or referendum-
like research shall take place; the village can be renamed provided that the 
majority of the inhabitants give their consent for such an alteration.
75 This 
should be considered an important development because under the 
Turkification policies more than 12,000 villages (approximately 35 percent of 
all the villages in Turkey) with Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, and Kurdish 
names were given a new Turkish name in between 1940-2000. 
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Thirdly, the Board of Higher Education in Turkey (YOK) allowed the state-
owned Mardin University to find the Institute of Living Languages. The 
institute would teach Kurdish, Persian, Arabic, and Aramaic. At first, it would 
only teach postgraduate and doctorate level students. In spite of the fact that 
this was one of the concrete steps of what has come to be known as the AKP’s 
Kurdish opening, it led to disappointment among some parts of the academic 
world and pro-Kurdish circles. They demanded the opening of the Department 
of Kurdish Language and Literature and the Institute of Kurdology instead of 
the Institute of Living Languages.
76 Turkey’s Board of Higher Education 
refused to give permission to the establishment of the Department of 
Kurdology on the grounds that there was not enough academic personal. But 
according to the President of the University, this is not true, as the University 
has sufficient academic personal at its disposal to teach at both graduate and 
undergraduate levels.
77 The basic reason for the refusal of Turkey’s Board of 
Higher Education is to restrain the explicit expression of “Kurdology” or 
“Kurdish language.” Using “living languages” is again an effort to conceal the 
name “Kurdish.”  
Three points should be accentuated concerning the Europeanization of 
minority policies and legislative changes in Turkey. Firstly, when the Turkish 
state adjusts certain legislations which might have implications on ethnic and 
religious groups that do not enjoy any official minority status, for example, 
the Kurds and Alevis, it never uses the term “minority.” Turkey has addressed 
the issue under the principles of individual human rights and general 
democratization norms. Interestingly, those groups themselves do not want to 
be labeled as “minority,” despite their demands, such as the right for 
education in the mother tongue. This is due to the fact that minorities 
themselves consider the status of being a minority as being “second class” 
citizens. Secondly, the constitutional amendments in accordance with the 
demands of the EU are still far from meeting the standards of the 
international legal instruments providing the protection of minorities. The 
reforms have indeed changed several undemocratic characteristics of the 
Turkish state; nevertheless, the essential features and underlying collective 
understanding of Turkish constitutional structure remain untouched. The 
official stance and policies towards the minorities that avoid granting cultural 
rights to any non-Muslim group are still the mainstream approach of Turkey. 
As of this day, Turkey still deals with the issues concerning ethnic minorities 
within the framework of universal human rights and refuses to instigate the 
discussion of “group rights” or collective rights. To put it more simply, an 
understanding based on ‘One (central) state, one nation, and one language’ 
continues to form the preeminent understanding of the Turkish Republic. 
Thirdly, there are still important problems regarding the implementation of 
even these limited minority reforms, owing to the fact that the implementing 
regulations have introduced important restrictions with regards to the full 
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enjoyment of those rights. There are severe reactions from bureaucratic 
structures such as the Supreme Court. The comprehensive reading of the 
provisions of the Turkish penal code concerning the territorial integrity of the 
state and nation has made the implementation of these norms de facto 
impossible.  
Overall, the impact of the EU reforms on the status of minorities in Turkey 
is very limited. Because of the implementation problems and bureaucratic 
resistance, the real conditions of the minorities in Turkey have not undergone 
drastic changes. However, in spite of the restrictions or shortcomings of these 
reforms, the impact of the EU lies in challenging the official ideology of the 
state concerning minority groups in Turkey. As a result of the EU’s pressure 
and the reforms thereafter, albeit not officially, Turkey has de facto 
recognized the existence of different ethnic groups, like the Kurds. 
 
3.3.2. Europeanization of National Identities and Beliefs on Minorities 
As it is seen above, Europeanization of minority policies can result in terms of 
legal changes. However, it does not anticipate changes in the identities and 
beliefs of the dominant groups on minorities. The direction of Europeanization 
of policies might not correlate positively with “societal-Europeanization” or 
Europeanization of identities. On the contrary, they can have the tendency to 
ensue in opposite directions. While Europeanization at the policy level might 
give rise to the recognition of certain cultural and language rights of the 
minorities, it can promote harsh opposition from dominant ethnic groups and 
hence lead to a rise in extreme nationalism. “The otherness” of minority 
groups at both the political and social level might be explicitly articulated. 
Rather than consolidating a consensual relationship, political reforms due to 
outside pressure can bring about discriminatory discourses and an ever 
increasing disintegration between minority and majority groups. 
Turkey is one of the cases where identity/belief Europeanization displays 
reverse paths from “policy-Europeanization.” As it is stated above, in terms of 
policy Europeanization, Turkey has initiated the process of reforms and has 
recognized, though limited and implicit, certain cultural and political rights of 
the Kurds. These reforms were followed by the new inclusive discourse of the 
Justice and Development Party government. The government enunciated the 
existence of different ethnicities, sub-identities, and cultures in Turkey. It 
endeavored to produce an alternative solution to the Kurdish issue through 
democratic means and commenced a policy called “democratic opening.” The 
project foresaw the improvement of cultural and identity rights, an economic 
stimulus package for the Kurdish region, and possibly an improved amnesty 
offer for lower-ranking PKK fighters.
78 Indeed, these developments were 
paradigmatic shifts in the official ideology of Turkey, which had long 
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renounced the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnicity and adopted a policy 
of forceful and systematic assimilation.  
On the other hand, such an optimistic picture in terms of belief/identity 
Europeanization cannot be acceptably observed. Despite the fact that the 
discourse of the Turkish state has shifted from “denial” to “recognition” of 
the Kurdish identity, it does not lead to the emergence of the Europeanization 
of national identity or belief that would accept Kurds as equal citizens at the 
broader public and institutional level. On the contrary, the EU reforms and 
the recent “democratic opening” project of the AKP have triggered harsh 
reactions at the political, societal, and institutional level.  
At the political level, the EU and the AKP reforms have resulted in the 
emergence of an anti-EU block in Turkey. This block consists of the extreme 
right wing supporters composed of ethno-nationalists, former left wing 
supporters encompassing anti-imperialist groups, and radical religious groups 
including anti-Western conservatives.
79 These forces have resurrected the 
“Sevres Syndrome” of Turkey. This is a perception that Turkey is encircled by 
internal and external enemies having some hidden agenda to disintegrate the 
Turkish state. The origins of this perception can be traced back to the 
Ottoman disintegration and the conclusion of the Sevres Treaty after the end 
of the First World War. The agreement stipulated the partition of 
contemporary Turkey on the basis of ethnic lines. Nevertheless, it was never 
implemented, as it was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which contained 
more positive terms for Turkey. However, Turkey has never overcome the fear 
of disintegration. Minorities have been approached with suspicion, since their 
image as “menace” to the unity of state remains unchanged in the collective 
memory of the Turkish society. Hence, any set of externally oriented political 
reforms are today easily perceived as a possible threat that could in time 
culminate in the destruction of Turkey.  
Subsequent to the EU and the AKP reforms concerning the Kurdish issue, 
this feeling of suspicion was revitalized by the anti-European block. The key 
players in this anti-European coalition are the members of the main opposition 
party, namely, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the ultra- nationalist 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). These political actors created an analogy 
between the reforms of the Ottoman Empire and those of the EU. The reforms 
of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19
th century extended the rights granted to 
minorities in order to comply with the demands of the Western powers. The 
objective of those reforms was to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire through granting certain citizenship rights to non-Muslim minorities 
struggling for independence. However, such reforms did not only fail to 
preserve territorial losses, but they also did not achieve the recognition of the 
Empire as a European state. Reviving this historical conviction, the anti-EU 
block claims that the European Union promoted reforms that aimed at 
enlarging individual and minority rights, which would provide the appropriate 
environment for the Kurdish separatism and in turn cause territorial 
 
 
79   Nicole Pope, "Facing up to the Big Red Apple," 35(3) Index on Censorship 2006, 78.82. Kizilkan-Kisacik – Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap 29  edap@eurac.edu 
disintegration, like the reforms in the 19
th century that led to the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. 
At the societal level, the reforms of the EU and the AKP generated 
nationalist reactions within the Turkish society. The Turkish state had long 
ignored the existence of a separate Kurdish identity. The Kurds were mostly 
considered as “mountain Turks” or at least, as Yegen (2006) expresses it more 
explicitly, “prospective Turks,” who had the potential of being assimilated by 
converging to Turkish identity.
80 In consequence of the EU and the AKP 
reforms, this perception has changed. The separate identity of the Kurds was 
de facto recognized. The cultural and political rights of the Kurds were 
partially adopted. Furthermore, at least at the governmental level, the state 
embraced a relatively liberal approach to the Kurdish problem. The different 
identity of the Kurds has gradually been pronounced. They became relatively 
more visible in the Turkish society as a result of the forceful displacement of 
Kurdish groups to the big cities in Turkey.
81 On the other hand, the image of 
the Kurds as “separatists,” who are in collaboration with external forces, has 
also been fortified in the course of the EU integration process.
82 This 
perceptional shift polarized Turkey further along ethnic lines and resulted in 
the emergence of negative anti-Kurdish discourses in Turkish society. Ethnic 
confrontation between Turkish and Kurdish groups in the western cities of 
Turkey has intensified as well. The incidences of attacks and protests against 
the Kurds have proliferated, signaling a looming large civil war against the 
Kurds. The problem has shifted from the military sphere to the social-political 
realm as the Kurds became more visible. This is due to the fact that the Kurds 
are deemed to be “equal” and free from discrimination as long as they are 
considered as a part of the “Turkish nation.”
83 As the EU reform process and 
recently adopted “democratic opening project” underlined and recognized 
the differences of the Kurdish minority in terms of their language and 
ethnicity, the image of the Kurds as a “trustworthy” or “faithful” Muslim 
group was replaced with that of a “principle other group” in the eyes of the 
Turkish nation.
84 
At the institutional level, it is not possible to observe any shifts in the 
attitudes and beliefs of the institutions, like the supreme and lower courts of 
Turkey. Those courts as the implementer of the amended legislations have not 
sustained any perceptional transformation
85 in parallel to the political 
reforms. They have interpreted the provisions of the Turkish penal code in a 
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very comprehensive manner on the basis of “unity of state and nation.”
86 For 
example, recently, the Constitutional Court decided to close down the pro-
Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for “becoming focused on terroristic 
activities.” 
87 The Court imposed a political ban on 37 party members for the 
duration of 5 years. Following the closure of the DTP, the new Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) was established and they formed a group in the 
parliament. After the closure of the party, the pressure on pro-Kurdish BDP 
has escalated. The police started an ongoing operation and arrested most of 
the local executives of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, including 
Council members of the party, executives from the women and youth council, 
county commissioners, and district executives.
88 Almost 1,662 BDP members 
are now under arrest.
89  
There are several reasons for these controversial tendencies. Granting 
Kurds certain political and cultural rights in the course of the EU process 
resulted in the discussion of the official ideology of the Turkish state. The 
ideology is, as expressed before, based on “one language, one state, and one 
nation” approach and on the Turkish identity being considered as the single 
superior national identity in Turkey. In the course of the reform process, this 
official ideology and identity are challenged. The recognition of groups, like 
Kurds, Alevis, and Arabs, living in Turkey has promoted the emergence of 
strong nationalistic feelings in the Turkish society, which was until recently 
convinced of the non existence of these groups. Today, the Turkish public and 
official institutions are facing the challenge of accepting and internalizing the 
recognition of the separate identity of the Kurds.  
Moreover, emerging nationalist feelings and anti-minority sentiments are 
used against the ruling party (AKP) and the pro-Kurdish party (BDP) by all 
opposition parties in the parliament. They manipulate the Turkish public by 
using extreme nationalist rhetoric against ethnic groups and by promoting the 
fear of disintegration in the case that ethnic groups are given their rights. This 
creates a vicious cycle. 
 As nationalism grows and forms the dominant part of 
the domestic politics, political parties, which could normally display the 
motivation to realize minority reforms, might switch to advocating nationalist 
discourses instead as they endeavor securing their seats in the next election. 
At this point of the minority reform process, the question is not whether 
decision makers have changed their beliefs, perception, and ideas about 
minority issue 
90as they obviously want to make domestic changes. The 
problem is to determine how their changing beliefs and perception could be 
transformed into policies with ultra-nationalism and anti-minority sentiments 
residing at the society level. For this reason, solving the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey requires not only the creation of a new definition of Turkish 
citizenship encompassing various ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, but 
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also in the creation of a psychological atmosphere and the adoption of 
confidence building measures at the societal level in which the Turkish public 
accepts Kurds as equal citizens and the Kurds accepts themselves as an 
integral part of the society. 
 
4. Patterns of Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey 
Europeanization of minority rights with respect to the Kurdish ethnic group 
has taken place in four steps in Turkey. These steps are partial-
institutionalization, de facto recognition, limited empowerment, and societal 
exclusion. The first two steps are the direct impact of the EU and they are 
related to policy Europeanization. However, the latter step can be 
conceptualized as the indirect consequences of the influence of the EU, which 
might be regarded as related to the societal and identity Europeanization.  
Firstly, the pressure of the EU led to the “partial institutionalization” of 
political and cultural rights of the Kurds. The bid for European integration has 
promoted important, albeit limited, domestic changes in terms of the 
minority protection system of Turkey. The perspective of membership given 
by the Helsinki Council Decision stimulated the political reform process. 
Despite the fact that such changes are far from the protection level granted 
by the EU and the Council of Europe, the pressure the EU exercised on Turkey 
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria resulted in the partial institutionalization of 
the minority rights in Turkey. Expanding the scope of cultural and identity 
rights paved the way for changes in the authoritarian-statist political regime 
and the enjoyment of more rights by the minorities. However, this does not 
mean that total protection was/has been guaranteed at the constitutional 
level. Turkey adopted an approach of “reform through gradual legislative 
change” without even mentioning the term minority. It accommodated the 
adaptation pressure of the EU by enacting “patchwork minority laws,” like the 
right to learn, teach, and broadcast in minority language. These changes, 
nonetheless, are piecemeal and partial in fashion. They do not anticipate any 
total transformation of minority-majority relations through drafting a new 
constitution based on broad consensus and ethnically neutral expressions. 
That is why minority related reforms patching up pre-existing legislative 
arrangements as a response to the pressure of the EU did not end in the real 
modification of the essential policies or of the logic underlying political 
behavior. On the contrary, total revision of fundamental laws and the 
constitution can barely be observed.  
Secondly, the EU has an impact on “de facto recognition” of the Kurdish 
identity and their minority rights, without making any connotation which puts 
them in the “minority” status. This is why the impact of the EU on minority 
rights protection is not limited to the accommodation of Turkey to the policy 
requirements with respect to minority protection at the legislative level. It 
has wider implications which reach beyond formal legislative changes. As it is 
mentioned above, Turkey has maintained a policy of assimilation and thereby 
refused to accept Kurds as a linguistic and ethnic group differing from the 
dominant Turkish identity. In the course of the 1990s, the legitimacy of all 
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walks of identities apart from the officially proscribed Turkish one was 
questioned. As Turkey wants to create strong institutional ties with the EU, 
the adaptation pressure of the EU to lift the limitations on Kurdish cultural 
articulation has augmented. Political reforms concerning the protection of 
minorities built the way for the open discussion of certain “taboo” issues in 
Turkish politics, like the Kurdish issue, the Turkish nation state, and identity. 
For the first time in the history of contemporary Turkey, the existence of a 
separate Kurdish identity was de facto recognized. Despite the above 
mentioned constitutional shortcomings, Turkey’s bid for the EU membership 
stimulates the current position of the Kurds in Turkey as a second regional-
ethnic-linguistic group. There is a movement from “there are no Kurds, so 
they have no rights” to “yes there are Kurds, but what rights should they 
have?” The contemporary discussion is actually based on “how and what kind 
of measures should be taken”
91 with respect to resolving the Kurdish problem. 
This is an important paradigmatic transformation in the official ideology of 
state.
92  
Thirdly, the EU has an impact on “the empowerment of domestic 
mobilization” of the Kurds through democratic channels. In the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, the Kurdish problem had been mentioned with reference to 
concepts like terror, violence, separatism, crime, and punishment. The 
security-defense aspect of the problem had been overemphasized, ignoring 
the political and cultural dimension of the problem. This picture is still valid 
in Turkey. Decision makers and the Turkish military in Turkey still consider 
“violence” as the primary means of treating the Kurdish problem. But the EU 
harmonization reforms have provided the ground for the discussion of the 
Kurdish issue on the basis of political and cultural nexus, gradually and 
indecisively taking it out of “violence” oriented policies.
93 General 
democratization in terms of the freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association provided by constitutional amendments makes the expression of 
Kurdish demands through democratic channels more possible.
94  
Lastly, the pressure of the EU has indirectly resulted in “societal 
exclusion,”
95 which then resulted in the emergence of anti-minority 
discourses and discriminatory practices on the minorities and the Kurds. On 
the one hand, the reforms enforced the consciousness of being different from 
the dominant Turkish identity among Kurds. On the other hand, the legislative 
changes prompted a new public image of the Kurds as a group with cultural 
practices and ethnic identities different than those of the Turkish public. This 
marked a fundamental perceptional shift, as the Kurds were considered as a 
 
 
91   Interview with Sah Ismail Bedirhanoglu, President of Southeastern Industrialist's and Businessmen's 
Association, Diyarbakir, Turkey.  
92   Ibid. 
93   Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, Former President of Diyarbakir Bar Association, Diyarbakir, Turkey.  
94   Interview with Mehmet Kaya, Former President of Diyarbakir Industry and Trade Association.  
95   See the discussion concerning “exclusive recognition” of the Kurds in Cenk Saracoglu, "'Exclusive 
Recognition': The New Dimensions of the Question of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Turkey…..,"645-
646 and Cenk Saracoglu, "The Changing Image of the Kurds in Turkish Cities: Middle-Class 
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component of the Turkish nation and thereby could elude being subject to 
systematic discrimination employed on the non-Muslim minorities. As the 
differences of the Kurds in terms of their identity are well articulated, the 
Kurds were left outside of the scope of the Turkish identity in popular 
perception. However, Kurdish groups remain vulnerable to the discriminatory 
practices, as the norms and values embedded in the reforms are not 
internalized at the public and elite level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the Europeanization of minority norms takes place 
at the societal/identity and policy level. By only analyzing legislative changes, 
the impact of the EU on minority rights protection can be partially observed. 
As Sasse (2008) argues, legal changes can conceal opposite political and 
societal tendencies in certain issue areas. It is only through analyzing the 
impact of the EU on policies, identities, and beliefs concurrently that the real 
impact of the EU can be captured. 
In terms of policy Europeanization, the EU’s direct impact on the 
institutional-legal context of minority protection can be well observed in 
Turkey by looking at legislative changes. If not sufficient, Turkey has made 
very important political reforms, touching upon Turkey’s fault lines like the 
Kurdish issues, and has granted important yet limited linguistic rights. The EU 
reforms institutionalized minority rights protection at the constitutional and 
legislative level partially and in a piecemeal fashion. For the first time in the 
history of Turkey, the Kurdish issue was addressed so apparently with an 
individual rights-based approach. The reforms also empowered bottom-up 
forces, like civil society organizations and minority groups, by opening up 
some space for their mobilization through democratic means. Even though 
European integration has not transformed the whole minority protection 
system of Turkey, it has commenced a process of change which partially 
institutionalizes, de facto recognizes, and empowers domestic mobilization of 
the Kurdish ethnic group in Turkey.  
In terms of the Europeanization of identities and beliefs with regard to the 
minority issue, however, it is not possible to draw such a positive picture. 
While the EU process led to the recognition or at least discussion of certain 
cultural rights of minorities and thereby made them more visible in the 
political establishments, it indirectly promoted harsh reactions at both the 
political and social levels in Turkey. The reaction could be pictured as 
increasing ultra-nationalism, intensified division between majority and 
minority groups, and anti-minority discourses. As such, legal changes did not 
lead to a parallel normative shift among the elite and at the society level in 
Turkey. In consequence, the legal changes only emphasized ‘the otherness” of 
the Kurdish ethnic group rather than establishing a harmonious and consensual 
relationship between majority-minority groups. 
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